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A.

ISSUE

This research memorandum seeks to examine the following issue:
Whether the Office of the Prosecutor for the Rwanda
International Tribunal may plea bargain with persons who are
willing to plead guilty and if so what are the requirements?1

B.

Summary of Conclusions

Although immunity is specifically prohibited,2 neither the Statute nor the
Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda deny the OTP the authority to engage in plea bargaining.3 Thus, the

1

See United Nations International Criminal tribunal for Rwanda, Office of the Prosecutor, Legal Research
Topics No. Ten, Fascimile dated 26 August 1999. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab K ].
2

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 415-6 (1998). During the preliminary consideration of the rules by
the judges, the United States suggested that immunity should be offered to defendants in
exchange for their cooperation. The President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Judge Antonio
Cassese, rejected the proposal stating that “[a]fter due reflection , we have decided that no one
should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their
testimony may otherwise be.” Id. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
3

See Vincent M. Creta, Comment: The Search For Justice in the Former Yugoslavia and
Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L. L.
381, 407 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab C].; See also Murphy, infra note 36, at 90; see also
United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Press Release dated 5 Mar. 1998,

5

OTP may engage in plea bargaining because plea bargaining is an implied
power that is “necessary for completing the investigation and the preparation and
conduct of the prosecution . . . .”4 However, the OTP must restrict its plea
negotiations strictly to those suspects and accuseds whom it considers, in its
judgement, to be lower level offenders.5
In order for the OTP to effectively engage in productive plea bargaining, it
will have to do so by strategically using the powers to amend an indictment under
Rule 506 and withdrawal of indictments under Rule 51.7 The OTP must
maneuver in such a manner because the International Tribunal has stated that
plea agreements between the OTP and accused have “no binding effect” on the
Trial Chamber, but will merely be “taken into careful consideration in determining
the sentence to be imposed upon the accused.”8 This position on the matter
The Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement Case No. ICTY , available in United
Nations website at http://www.un.org. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab G].
4

Rule 39 of the Rwanda Tribunal Statute provides in pertinent part:
“In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may:
(ii)
undertake such other matters as may appear necessary for completing the investigation
and the preparation and conduct of the prosecution at the trial, including the taking of
special measures to provide for the safety of potential witnesses and informants.”
[reproduced in Appendix, Tab I].
5

See Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT’L. L. 365, 377-8 (1999). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].
6

Rule 50 of the Rwandan Tribunal Rules provides in pertinent part: “The Prosecutor may amend
an indictment, without leave, at any time before its confirmation . . . .” [reproduced in Appendix, Tab
I].
7

Rule 51(A) of the Rwandan Tribunal Rules provides: “The Prosecutor may withdraw an
indictment, without leave, at any time before its confirmation, but thereafter only with the leave of
the Judge who confirmed it or, if at trial, only with leave of the Trial Chamber.” [reproduced in
Appendix, Tab I].
8

In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber stated: “Plea bargain agreements are common
in certain jurisdictions of the world. There is no provision for such agreements in the Statute and
Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the International Tribunal. This is the first time that such a
document [plea agreement] has been presented to the International Tribunal. The plea
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poses a serious obstacle to the OTP seeking to obtain information and guilty
plea’s from lower level suspects9 and/or accuseds.10 This is because the
suspects and accuseds will have no advance certainty of what the effect their
cooperation will be.11 Hence the OTP will need to strategically use its power to
amend and withdraw indictments in order to engage in fruitful plea negotiations.

II.
A.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

LEGAL BASIS FOR PLEA BARGAINING
1. Fundamentals of Plea Bargaining

agreement in this case is simply an agreement between the parties, reached on their own
initiative without the contribution or encouragement of the Trial Chamber. Upon being questioned
by the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, the accused confirmed his agreement to and
understanding of the matters contained therein. The parties themselves acknowledge that the
plea agreement has no binding effect on this chamber, although submissions recommending it
were made by both the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel at the hearing on 14 January 1998, in
addition to the recommendations in the joint motion. Whilst in no way bound by this agreement,
the Trial Chamber has taken it into careful consideration in determining the sentence to be
imposed upon the accused. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Press
Release dated 5 Mar. 1998, The Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement Case No.
ICTY , available in United Nations website at http://www.un.org. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab G].
9

The Rwandan Tribunal Rules define “suspect” as “[a] person concerning whom the Prosecutor
possesses reliable information which tend to show that he may have committed a crime over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or Military
Justice: Which is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 475, 490 (1995).
[reproduced in Appendix, Tab D].
10

The Rwandan Tribunal Rules define “accused” as “[a] person against whom an indictment has
been submitted to the designated trial chamber judge for confirmation.” Id. at 489.
11

See Id. at 508. The absence of a plea bargaining mechanism: (1) does not permit “to receive
a commitment in advance of trial as to the exact exchange for his or her cooperation; (2) reduces
the “prosecutor’s ability to successfully prosecute higher-level suspects before the Tribunal
through cooperation of lower level suspects; and (3) “hinders the prosecutor’s ability to negotiate

7

Plea bargaining is a practice that dates back to the 1700’s when the old
English common law courts would grant pardons to accomplices in felony cases
upon the defendant’s conviction, or execution upon the defendant’s acquittal.12
Today, however, and for the purposes of this memorandum, plea bargaining is a
mechanism whereby “the prosecutor and defense counsel [accused and/or
suspect] enter into an agreement resolving one or more criminal charges against
the defendant without a trial.”13
The benefits of plea bargaining are considerable and it is considered an
indispensable tool without which certain “judicial system[s] would collapse.”14
This is because the number of criminal offenders in many judicial systems often
outnumber the courts, judges, prosecutors, and prisons cells.15 Plea bargaining
greatly reduces the strain on the criminal justice system and therefore is
considered essential to maintain its efficient functioning. Particularly from the
prosecutor’s perspective, some of the benefits of plea bargaining are the saving
of time and resources.16 However, perhaps one of the most important benefits of
plea bargaining to a prosecutor is that it permits him/her to gain the cooperation
a just result without having to put vulnerable victims or witnesses through the ordeal of a trial or to
negotiate victim compensation as part of the agreement.” Id.
12

See HEDIEH NASHERI, BETRAYAL OF DUE PROCESS 79 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix,
Tab L].
13

G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].

14

See NASHERI, supra note 12, at p.25. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].

15

See generally NASHERI, supra note 12, at 25 (quoting Warren E. Burger, “The State of the
Judiciary,” 56 AMERICAN BAR ASSOC. J. 929-934 (1970) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L]. Chief
Justice Burger stated “that if rate of criminal cases settled by guilty pleas were to decrease by
10% we would need twice as many judges and courtrooms.” Id.
16

See HERMAN, supra note13, at 1. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].
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of the accused “in the capture of, and compilation of evidence against, larger
criminal figures.”17
Plea bargaining can occur at several stages of the criminal process.18 It
can occur before or after the defendant is formally charged.19 Plea bargaining
pertinently results in one or more of the following: (1) an agreement by the
prosecutor to not charge the defendant; (2) a plea of guilty by the defendant to a
reduced charge or a lesser included charge; and/or (3) a plea of guilty by the
defendant to a particular charge in exchange for a dismissal of other charges.20
Plea agreements can and often are conditioned “upon the defendant’s
agreement to certain conditions such as cooperating in an investigation, giving
testimony for the prosecution against another defendant [and] refraining from
further violation of the law . . . .”21

2. The Prosecutor Has the Authority to Engage in Plea Bargaining.
Although immunity is specifically prohibited,22 neither the Statute nor the
Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the International Criminal Tribunal for

17

Creta, supra note 3, at 407 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab C].

18

See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 1. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].

19

See Id.

20

See Id.

21

Id.

22

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 415-6 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H]. During the preliminary
consideration of the rules by the judges, the United States suggested that immunity should be
offered to defendants in exchange for their cooperation. The President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal,

9

Rwanda deny the OTP the authority to engage in plea bargaining.23 Thus, the
OTP may engage in plea bargaining because plea bargaining is an implied
power that is “necessary for completing the investigation and the preparation and
conduct of the prosecution . . . .”24 However, as this memorandum will later
explain, the OTP must restrict its plea negotiations exclusively to those suspects
and accused’s who the prosecutor considers to be lower level offenders.25

a. Plea Bargaining is permissible because it does not contravene the policy
prohibiting granting immunity and because neither the Rwandan Statute
nor the Rules of Evidence and Procedure prohibit the OTP from plea
bargaining.
The President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Judge Antonio Cassese,
specifically stated that “no one” should be granted immunity “no matter how
useful their testimony may otherwise be.”26 However, the extent to which Judge

Judge Antonio Cassese, rejected the proposal stating that “[a]fter due reflection , we have
decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how
useful their testimony may otherwise be.” Id.
23

See Creta, supra note 3, at 407 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab C.; see also Murphy, infra note 36,
at 90; see also United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Press Release
dated 5 Mar. 1998, The Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement Case No. ICTY ,
available in United Nations website at http://www.un.org. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab G].
24

Rule 39 of the Rwanda Tribunal Statute provides in pertinent part:
“In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor may:
(iii)
undertake such other matters as may appear necessary for completing the investigation
and the preparation and conduct of the prosecution at the trial, including the taking of
special measures to provide for the safety of potential witnesses and informants.”
[reproduced in Appendix, Tab I].
25

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 377-8 (1999) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].

26

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 415-6 (1998). During the preliminary consideration of the rules by
the judges, the United States suggested that immunity should be offered to defendants in
exchange for their cooperation. The President of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Judge Antonio
Cassese, rejected the proposal stating that “[a]fter due reflection, we have decided that no one
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Cassese intended this statement to prohibit plea bargaining is unclear. Did
Judge Cassese intend this statement to prohibit immunity that involves
withdrawing one indictable charge with respect to a lower-level offender,27 while
convicting him on another, or did he intend to prohibit granting immunity that
involves completely pardoning the offender without imposing any punishment?
It would appear that Judge Cassese’s intent was to prohibit the latter and
to permit the former. Judge Cassese himself has argued that the Chapter VII
mandate of the ad hoc tribunals justifies a focus on bringing to trial those who are
most responsible for the underlying threat to international peace.28 This position
is well grounded since “[o]nly exceptional crimes, after all, are committed by
government elites, are the subject of international treaties or customary law, and
implicate transborder issues of direct concern to organizations such as the
United Nations.”29
The initial prosecution strategy of the Yugoslavia Tribunal formulated by
the first prosecutor, Justice Goldstone, also called for a strategy primarily

should be immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their
testimony may otherwise be.” Id. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
27

For the purposes of this memorandum lower level offenders will be generally defined as those
persons who do not hold higher levels of responsibility, or those who have not been personally
responsible for the exceptionally brutal or otherwise extremely serious offenses. See Sean D.
Murphy, Developments in International Criminal Law: Progress and Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 57, 59 (1999)
(citing Statement by the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal of the Charges Against 14
Accused, ICTY Doc. CC/PIU/314-E (May 8, 1998)). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab F].
28

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 372 (citing Antonio Cassese, The International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 229 (1996)) [reproduced in Appendix,
Tab A].
29

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 372 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A]..
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focusing on pursuing and indicting higher-ups.30 The OTP for the ICTY has
already been applying the initiative to indict the higher-ups since 1997.31 To this
end, the OTP for the ICTY has continued to indict only high-level offenders.32
The OTP for the ICTY, following the withdrawal of charges against 14 accused,
stated that its strategy may be characterized as one which is “maintaining an
investigative focus on persons holding higher levels of responsibility, or on those
who have been personally responsible for the exceptionally brutal or otherwise
extremely serious offenses.”33
Many international lawyers agree on this position and also justify their
preference for indicting higher-ups on grounds that the scarce resources of the
international community, generally speaking, leave no other option.34 In 1996,
there were approximately 90,000 detainees being held in Rwandan Prisons and
by 1998 that number had grown to approximately 130,000.35 In the First Annual

30

See Richard Goldstone, The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Case Study in
Security Council Action, 6 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 7 (1995).

31

See Murphy, supra note 27, at 64 (citing Statement by the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal
of the Charges Against 14 Accused, ICTY Doc. CC/PIU/314-E (May 8, 1998) [reproduced in
Appendix, Tab F].
32

Id.

33

Id.

34

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 372 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A]. “From the outset,
international lawyers have argued that the scarce resources of the international community need
to be devoted to trying those perpetrators who have the greatest responsibility, by which they
mean the leaders and instigators, at a high policy level, of mass atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. While circumstances such as the fortuitous sighting and subsequent
arrest of a low-level Serbian perpetrator, Dusko Tadic, compelled the ICTY to proceed with his
trial as its first full fledged effort, tribunal insiders and supporters have generally argued that the
tribunals’ success will be judged by the degree to which both reach high level perpetrators.” Id.
35

Alvarez, supra note 5, at 393 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].
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Report of the Rwandan Tribunal,36 it was noted that a lack of human and material
resources posed serious barriers to the OTP in executing its work.37
That Judge Cassese’s intent could not have been to prohibit plea
bargaining with lower-level offender’s is also supported by the fact that the
greatest deterrent effect will be achieved by prosecuting major figures.38
International lawyers argue that “trials for large numbers of perpetrators are not
necessary to achieve most if not all, of their goals.”39 They argue that this is
because “the ultimate foundation for prevention of future criminal behavior is the
transformation of future criminal behavior and the gradual internalization of
values that encourage habitual conformity with the law.”40 It is clear that “without
leaders mass crimes would not occur.”41 Thus, it is felt that “enforcement
advantages enjoyed by international tribunals apply only with respect to the
prosecutions of higher-ups, and that for this reason, lower-level perpetrator’s
should mostly be dealt with by national courts ‘as guided by the decisions of the
international tribunal.’”42

36

U.N. Doc. A/51/399-S/1996/778, Annex(1996).

37

Id.

38

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 219 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
39

Alvarez, supra note 5, at 378 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].

40

Id.

41

Madeleine Morris, Symposium: Justice in Cataclysm Crim. Trials In Wake of Mass Violence:
Article: The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Care of Rwanda, 7 DULE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
349, 367 (1997).
42

Alvarez, supra note 5, at 377-8 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].
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A final argument in support of the OTP’s authority to engage in plea
bargaining is that both the structure of the Rwandan Tribunal, which is largely
based on an adversarial model,43 and the sole responsibility placed with the OTP
to initiate and conduct investigations, indicate that the drafters of Rwandan
Statutes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure preferred the approaches found
traditionally in the common law44-- including plea bargaining.45 Therefore, plea
bargaining would appear be an unobjectionable exercise of authority by the OTP
because it is a practice consistent with the drafters’ preference for the common
law model. This is important because the OTP would not thereby be engaging in
any overreaching of authority by plea bargaining
The implied power of the OTP to engage in plea bargaining would appear
to be exercisable pursuant to the power to “undertake such other matters as may
appear necessary for completing the investigation and the preparation and
conduct of the prosecution.”46 Plea bargaining, therefore, would be an “implied
necessary power”47 because if the OTP were prohibited from engaging in plea
negotiations with lower level offenders, the ability of the OTP to fulfill an
important purpose behind establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda,

43

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 380 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
44

See Johnson, supra note 81 , at 144 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab B].

45

See NASHERI, supra note 12, at 79[reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].

46

Rule 39(ii) of the Rwandan Tribunal Rules [reproduced in Appendix, Tab I].

47

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 454 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
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which is to reach those in control of committing the atrocities,48 would be severely
impaired. Without the power to enter into plea bargains, and if the OTP were
forced to try every case against lower level offenders, many of the most serious
perpetrators would escape prosecution because the limited resources of the
international community would become exhausted trying the lower level
offenders.

B.

WHEN AND HOW THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR MAY PLEA
BARGAIN WITH A SUSPECT AND AN ACCUSED.

The International Tribunal has stated that plea agreements between the
OTP and accused have “no binding effect” on the Trial Chamber, but will merely
be “taken into careful consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed
upon the accused.”49 This decision by the International Tribunal to reject the
binding effect of a plea agreement poses a serious obstacle to the OTP seeking

48

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 372 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].

49

In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the Trial Chamber stated: “Plea bargain agreements are common
in certain jurisdictions of the world. There is no provision for such agreements in the Statute and
Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the International Tribunal. This is the first time that such a
document [plea agreement] has been presented to the International Tribunal. The plea
agreement in this case is simply an agreement between the parties, reached on their own
initiative without the contribution or encouragement of the Trial Chamber. Upon being questioned
by the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, the accused confirmed his agreement to and
understanding of the matters contained therein. The parties themselves acknowledge that the
plea agreement has no binding effect on this chamber, although submissions recommending it
were made by both the Prosecutor and Defense Counsel at the hearing on 14 January 1998, in
addition to the recommendations in the joint motion. Whilst in no way bound by this agreement,
the Trial Chamber has taken it into careful consideration in determining the sentence to be
imposed upon the accused. United Nations, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Press
Release dated 5 Mar. 1998, The Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Sentencing Judgement Case No.
ICTY , available in United Nations website at http://www.un.org. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab G].
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to obtain information and guilty plea’s from lower level suspects50 and/or
accuseds.51 This is because such persons have no advance certainty what the
effect their cooperation will be.52 Thus, in post indictment situations the OTP, in
order to engage in effective plea bargaining, must do so by strategically using the
powers to amend an indictment under Rule 5053 and to withdraw indictments
under Rule 51.54
The OTP may engage in plea bargaining with a suspect or an accused by
agreeing to add or drop various charges or indictments in return for a guilty plea
on other charges and indictment and/or in return for information. However, the
OTP must be aware of the substantial difference between the level of freedom
the OTP has to plea bargain with suspects prior to indictment (hereinafter “preindictment”) and the level of freedom it has to plea bargain with accused persons

50

The Rwandan Tribunal Rules define “suspect” as “[a] person concerning whom the Prosecutor
possesses reliable information which tend to show that he may have committed a crime over
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction. See Falvey, supra note 9, at 490 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab
D].

51

The Rwandan Tribunal Rules define “accused” as “[a] person against whom an indictment has
been submitted to the designated trial chamber judge for confirmation.” Id. at 489.
52

See Id. at 508. The absence of a plea bargaining mechanism: (1) does not permit “to receive
a commitment in advance of trial as to the exact exchange for his or her cooperation; (2) reduces
the “prosecutor’s ability to successfully prosecute higher-level suspects before the Tribunal
through cooperation of lower level suspects; and (3) “hinders the prosecutor’s ability to negotiate
a just result without having to put vulnerable victims or witnesses through the ordeal of a trial or to
negotiate victim compensation as part of the agreement.” Id.
53

Rule 50 of the Rwandan Tribunal Rules provides in pertinent part: “The Prosecutor may amend
an indictment, without leave, at any time before its confirmation . . . .” [reproduced in Appendix, Tab
I]
54

Rule 51(A) of the Rwandan Tribunal Rules provides: “The Prosecutor may withdraw an
indictment, without leave, at any time before its confirmation, but thereafter only with the leave of
the Judge who confirmed it or, if at trial, only with leave of the Trial Chamber.” Id.

16

subsequent to indictment (hereinafter “post-indictment”).55 The OTP has much
more freedom to plea bargain with pre-indictment suspects.56 In contrast, the
level of freedom to plea bargain is much more circumscribed with post-indictment
accuseds.57 Finally, an alternative available to the OTP is to have lower level
offenders be prosecuted by the Rwandan local courts, and to use the information
generated through their plea bargaining mechanism to pursue the higher ups.58

1.

Pre-Indictment Plea Bargaining

If the plea agreement involves the promise not to bring certain charges or
an indictment against the suspect prior to indictment in return for information
about other suspects or a guilty plea on other charges,59 the OTP may do so
without having to seek prior approval of the Trial Chamber Judge.60 This is
considered to be within the discretion of the OTP prior to a judicial determination

55

See generally 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 480 (1998) [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
56

See Id.

57

See Id.

58

Rwandan local courts have a plea bargaining mechanism in place. See Alvarez, supra note 5,
at 400 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].

59

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 480 (1998). Rule 49 of the Rwanda Tribunal Rules provides that: “Two or more
crimes may be joined in one indictment if the series of acts committed together form the same
transaction, and the said crimes were committed by the same accused. [reproduced in Appendix,
Tab H].
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1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 480 (1998); See also Rule 50 of the Rwanda Tribunal Rules; See also Rule 51
of the Rwanda Tribunal Rules. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
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of the matter.61 Hence, the OTP enjoys considerable freedom in pre-indictment
plea bargaining because there is no role for Trial Chamber review at that stage.
Under this analysis, pre-indictment plea bargaining would appear to be a
continuation or extension of the OTP’s investigative powers during which period
the OTP is primarily engaged in gathering evidence to build its prima facie case
necessary for an indictment.62 In essence, the OTP would contact a suspect
informing him of the strength of the evidence against him and give the suspect an
opportunity to cooperate by providing the OTP with information against other
higher level offenders. In return the OTP would offer to not bring certain
indictments and/or charges.

2.

Post-indictment Plea Bargaining

In contrast, though the decision to withdraw an indictment is considered to
be within the discretion of the OTP, OTP may not as freely engage in postindictment plea bargaining. This is because the OTP must first obtain approval
from the judge who originally confirmed the indictment.63 Hence, a decision to
withdraw an indictment will be subject to “judicial review to ensure that there are
reasons for doing so.” 64 The above arguments, however, should provide a

61

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 480, 483 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
62

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 478 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
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See Rule 50 of the Rwanda Tribunal Rules. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab I].
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1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 484 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
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sufficient enough justification for withdrawal of charges against a lower level
offender who pleads guilty to other charges and or provides information against
other higher level perpetrators.
In practice, it appears that the International Tribunal has been fairly lenient
in granting permission to amend and withdraw charges from an indictment.65 In
May 1998, the OTP for the ICTY withdrew charges against fourteen persons
stating that it was necessary to focus “the resources of the of the Tribunal on
persons holding higher levels of responsibility . . . .”66 The Trial Chambers
permitted this despite the fact that the decision to withdraw the charges was not
based on any lack of evidence.67

III.

PLEA BARGAINING IN THE COMMON LAW COUNTRIES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA

A.

PLEA BARGAINING: PROSECUTORIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s typical objective will be to “obtain a
plea that is as close to the result that would be obtained if the defendant were
convicted as charged.”68 Accordingly, the following discussion will concentrate

65

See Murphy, supra note 27, at 72-3.

66

See Id. at 64 (citing Statement by the Prosecutor Following the Withdrawal of the Charges
Against 14 Accused, ICTY Doc. CC/PIU/314-E (May 8, 1998).
67

Id. “The prosecutor stated that the decision to seek the withdrawal was based on the need to
focus the resources of the Tribunal on persons holding higher levels of responsibility than has
been held by these accused. She stated that ‘this decision is not based on any lack of evidence
in respect of these accused. I do not consider it feasible at this time to hold multiple separate
trials for related offenses committed by perpetrators who could appropriately be tried in another
judicial forum, such as a state court.’” Id.
68

HERMAN, supra note 16, at 5. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].
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on the factors a prosecutor will need to qualitatively and quantitatively consider in
achieving this objective.

1.

Fundamental Considerations

Generally, one of the most important and initial factors a prosecutor
should consider prior to entering into plea negotiations is the strength of their
case.69 The prosecutor must consider whether he/she possesses proof sufficient
to satisfy the threshold of proof necessary for a conviction.70 This is an important
consideration because if the OTP lacks sufficient evidence to convict a suspect
or accused, the suspect or accused will not be inclined to engage in plea
negotiations. In sum, “the relative strength of the prosecutor’s case, the
likelihood of an appeallable issue, and the relative trial skills of the defense
counsel and the prosecutor” will be imperative factors that should be evaluated
prior to the decision of whether to plea bargain with a suspect or accused.71
An obvious consideration the OTP will need to entertain in deciding
whether to plea bargain is the severity of the crime and the nature and extent of
the suspect or accused’s participation in the commission of the offense.72 There
is a great deal of consensus among international lawyers and policy makers that
those persons who are the orchestrators, the military leaders and politicians

69

See Id.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 5-6.

72

See Id.
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should be prosecuted to the fullest.73 Hence, the OTP should not engage in plea
bargaining with the higher-ups no matter how useful their testimony may
otherwise be. Rather plea bargaining should be an option reserved exclusively
for lower-level suspects and accused persons.
The “background and status” of the suspect and accused should also be
considered in determining whether to engage in plea bargaining.74 Specifically,
the “age, . . . , family circumstances, health, . . . , prior criminal record . . . [ ], all
should be considered.75
“Budgetary and resource constraints” are always a necessary
consideration.76 It is quite clear that the OTP for the Rwandan Tribunal is
constrained by the limited budget, time and personnel.77 Plea bargaining is one
of the most effective mechanisms by which to greatly reduce the depleting to
these already scarce resources.
Finally, one of the most important considerations the OTP will need to
consider is the ability of the defendant to assist in the indictment of the higherlevel offenders.78 For example, a suspect or offender who is at the bottom of the
hierarchy of offenders and who had little or no contact with any of the higher-ups,
will have very little to add to what the prosecutor may already know. It would
73

See Alvarez, supra note 5, at 362. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab A].

74

See HERMAN, supra note 16, at 6. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 7.
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therefore be of no advantage to engage in plea bargaining with such a suspect or
accused. In this connection, the OTP will also need to assess the
trustworthiness and willingness of the suspect or accused to cooperate.79

B.

PLEA BARGAINING SYSTEMS IN CANADA AND THE UNTIED STATES
The plea bargaining systems of Canada and the United States are being

used illustratively in this memo because the roles of the OTP and the Trial
Chamber judges are greatly similar to the roles of the prosecutor and judges in
these two countries.80

1.

Similarity Between he Roles of the Prosecutor and Judge in the ICTR and
the United States Criminal Justice Systems.
Similar to the OTP, prosecutors in the United States are given tremendous

discretion in the exercise of their investigative and prosecutorial powers.81 A
prosecutor in the United States “has broad authority to decide whether to
investigate, grant immunity, or permit a plea bargain and to determine whether to
bring charges, what charges to bring, when to bring charges, and where to bring
charges.”82 The prosecutor’s broad discretion is recognized by courts of the

79

Id.

80

Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT’L. LEG. PERSP. 111, 141 (1998). “The
ICTY’s organizational structure is not unlike that of many domestic systems which have separate
adjudicative, prosecutorial and administrative functions. The roles of the prosecutor and judges
are, however, more akin to the common law systems found in countries such as Australia,
Canada, Great Britain and the United States.” Id. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab B].
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NASHERI , supra note 12, at 26. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].
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Micehelle A. Gail, Prosecutorial Discretion, 85 GEO. L. J. 983, 983 (1997).
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United States “in part out of regard for the separation of powers doctrine and in
part because ‘the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review.’”83 This separation of powers doctrine is akin to the OTP which
“constitutes the separate and independent organ of the Rwandan Tribunal . . . .”84
Further similarity may be observed by comparing the role of the judges in
the plea bargaining process. In the ICTR system, the judge does not participate
whatsoever in the pre-indictment plea negotiation/plea bargaining process.85
Similarly, because plea bargaining often takes place at such an early stage of
American proceedings, the judges are often unable to review the prosecutor’s
judgment,86 while judges in the federal systems are completely prohibited from
participating in the plea negotiation.87 A final similarity between the two systems
may be observed in that plea agreements in both the ICTY and United States are
ultimately subject to judicial scrutiny.88

2.

83

Similarity Between the Role of the Judge and Prosecutor in the ICTR and
the Canadian Criminal Justice Systems.

Id.

84

1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA 383 (1998). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab H].
85

This is because, as discussed, this is considered within the discretion of the OTP and because
the judge does not become involved in the prosecutor’s case until the OTP has filed an
indictment.
86

NASHERI, supra note 12, at 25 [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L]; see also HERMAN, supra note
16, at 143 ( stating that a study investigating the level of judicial participation in plea bargaining
revealed that seventeen of the fifty judges interviewed participated in plea bargaining). [reproduced
in Appendix, Tab M].
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NASHERI, supra note 12, at 35. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].
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Id. at 34; see also Murphy, supra note 27, at 43. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab F].
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The Canadian plea bargaining system is especially relevant because it is
a mechanism that is “not well entrenched” into the criminal justice system.89 A
Canadian commentator states that:
[b]argaining has never been fully recognized as a legitimate practice in
Canada, at least not to the same extent as in some American
jurisdictions. There is by no means a uniform set of rules governing this
process, and the way in which functions depends primarily on the kinds
of relationships that have grown up between magistrates, Crown
attorneys and defense counsel in particular parts of the province.90

This treatment of plea bargaining is relevant because plea bargaining in the ICTR
is similarly not a commonly accepted practice.91 Plea bargaining, or “plea
negotiation” as it is referred to in Canada,92 has gained what is described as a
“silent acceptance.”93 This description is used because although Canadian
courts “have reluctantly dealt with the legal entanglements that arise in plea
bargaining,” they have nonetheless let it continue.94
In contrast to the United States and ICTR, the prosecutor95 is not the sole
individual responsible for investigation of an offense in the Canadian criminal

89

NASHERI, supra note 12, at 48. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].
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Id. at 48.
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Id.
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NASHERI, supra note 12, at 48. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].
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Id. at 63.
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Id. at 63.
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Prosecutor is referred to as the Crown Attorney in the Canadian criminal justice system. Id. at
48.
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justice system.96 Notwithstanding this, the prosecutor does engage in plea
bargaining once the case has been referred to its office.97 It appears that this is
ordinarily done during a meeting that is held once the accused decides to plead
guilty98 in the Crown Attorney’s Office.99 It is at this meeting that the accused,
accompanied by defense counsel, discusses with the Crown Attorney what would
be the appropriate sentence in return for a guilty plea and whether the accused
will plead guilty to reduced charges or a lesser included offense.100
However, as is the case in the United States and the ICTR, the plea
agreement is again ultimately subject to judicial scrutiny. Similar to the United
States and the ICTR, the judge does not participate in the plea negotiation101 but
retains the ultimately authority to accept or reject the plea agreement.102 In the
Canadian criminal justice system the judge is not required to inquire into the
propriety of the plea agreement entered into, and ordinarily will accept it provided
that he is “’sufficiently’ informed of the facts upon which the defendant pleads

96

In the Canadian system there are two types of criminal cases: police cases and government
department created cases. Though Crown Attorneys are expected to supervise and control
police cases, the police are primarily responsible in police cases with charging someone,
choosing the charge, and the investigation of police cases. Hence, the Crown Attorney does not
really become involved until the police have completed their investigation and charged an
offender and have referred the case to the Crown Attorney’s office for prosecution. In contrast,
the Crown Attorney is fully responsible for the investigation and prosecution of government cases.
Id. at 49.
97

Id. at 62.
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 68.

100

Id. at 49, 62.
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This is done primarily to avoid any compromise of the case that may result if the trial judge
were to be present when the defendant decides to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 50.
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guilty, especially when the charge carries a heavy maximum sentence or the
defendant might have good grounds for a defense.”103 Furthermore, in the
Canadian criminal justice system, the judge makes the ultimate determination
regarding the sentence to be imposed.104

3.

Fundamental Observations on Plea Bargaining in the United States.
Approximately 90% of all criminal cases are resolved through plea

bargaining in the Untied States.105 The process of plea bargaining in the United
States is guided by three sources of law: (1) the United States Constitution; (2)
statutes; and (3) judicial pronouncements found in case law.106 While plea
bargaining on the federal and state level is commonly governed by statute,107
the focus of the following discussion will be some of the more important and
general principles as found in case law before the enactment of Rule 11(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure108 and case law discussing the performance
and breach of plea agreements.

102

Id. at 73.
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Id. at 68.
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Id. at 1.

106

Id. at 14.

107

Id.

108

Reproduced in Appendix, Tab O.

26

Prior to the enactment of Rule 11(e), the focus on plea bargaining
revolved around the voluntaries of the guilty plea.109 The general criteria
required for a guilty plea obtained through plea bargaining was that the guilty
plea must not have been “induced by promises or threats which deprived [the
plea] of a voluntary act.“110 A plea will not be considered voluntary if it was
induced by threats or coercion,111 was based on unfulfilled112 or improper
promises,113 or if the defendant was mentally incompetent.114 In addition, the

109

Id. at 14.

110

See Id. at 19 (citing Marchibroda v. U.S., 386 U.S. 487 (1969) in which an imprisoned
defendant filed an appeal claiming he was induced to plead guilty by promises of an Assistant
United States Attorney that if he pleaded guilty, he would receive a total sentence of not more
than 20 years. The defendant also alleged (1) that he was told by the Assistant United
States Attorney that if he advised his lawyer of the promises, unsettled matters
relating to other robberies would be added to his difficulties, and (2) that he
wrote four unanswered letters, two to the sentencing court and two to the United
States Attorney General, regarding the Assistant United States Attorney's
promises. The Supreme Court held the plea invalid because the lower court did not afford the
defendant with a final hearing and opportunity to make a statement before entering the plea.)).
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HERMAN, supra note 16, at 12 (citing Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941)). [reproduced in
Appendix, Tab M].
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Id. (citing Marchibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 467 (1962)).
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Id. (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 487 (1970) in which a defendant had been
charged with kidnapping. Once the kidnapping statute was held unconstitutional, the defendant
claimed his plea was invalid because fear of receiving the death penalty was coercive factor in his
decision to enter the plea. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held the decision in United States v
Jackson did not require that every guilty plea entered under the kidnapping statute be invalidated,
even when the fear of death was shown to have been a factor in the plea; (2) the voluntaries of a
guilty plea under the statute was to be determined by considering all of the relevant
circumstances, including the possibility of a heavier sentence following a guilty verdict; (3) even
assuming that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty except for the death penalty provision
of the statute, nevertheless such assumption merely identified the penalty provision as a "but for"
cause of his plea, and the fact that the statute caused the plea in such sense did not necessarily
prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary act;(4) a guilty plea was not invalid
under the Fifth Amendment whenever it was motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the
certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face the possibility of a greater penalty after
trial; (5) the Fifth Amendment did not forbid prosecutors and judges to accept guilty pleas to
selected counts, to lesser included offenses, or to reduced charges; (6) a plea of guilty was not
invalid merely because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty; and (7) the guilty plea
in the case at bar was properly held to be valid as voluntarily and knowingly made,
notwithstanding that the defendant might have been partially motivated by fear of the death
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entry of the plea must be knowledgeable.115 A court will invalidate the plea itself
if it determines that the defendant does not have a full understanding of the plea
and of its consequence.116 American courts will also invalidate a plea if it finds
that the prosecutor obtained the plea by threatening the defendant with
prosecution if the defendant refuses to provide information or testify without first
promising to grant some sort immunity to the defendant. 117
Issues involving the performance and breach of plea agreements have
also been addressed by courts of the United States. These issues have typically
been analyzed using traditional contract principles.118 In general, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that “when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”119
Therefore, it could be inferred that if the prosecutor withdraws his plea before the
defendant enters a guilty plea or before the defendant has significantly relied
upon the prosecutor’s promise, the defendant will ordinarily have no recourse,
penalty and notwithstanding that the death penalty provision of the statute was subsequently
declared to be unconstitutional.
114

Id. (citing Chavez v. U.S., 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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NASHERI , supra note 12, at 19. (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) in which the
Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision holding that the defendant’s plea was voluntary
because there was no record evidencing the such voluntariness. The Supreme Court held that
not only must the plea be completely voluntary, but that there must also be a written record
indicating such voluntariness)). [reproduced in Appendix, Tab L].
116

HERMAN, supra note 16, at 12 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). [reproduced in
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unless perhaps the defendant has waived a constitutional right,120 or has
provided substantial cooperation by providing information.121
A promise made by a prosecutor must also be kept by a subsequent
prosecutor who is assigned the case.122 However, a prosecutor is not bound by
a promise which is not accepted by and which does not cause the defendant to
rely to his detriment on it.123
The typical remedy for a defendant in the event the prosecutor has
breached the agreement, is specific performance.124 Thus, if the prosecutor
breaches his promise to withdraw certain charges, the defendant may have the
agreement judicially enforced and have the charges withdrawn.
The prosecutor is permitted to breach his promise in certain limited
instances. Most common is where the prosecutor learns that the defendant has
defrauded the prosecutor, or because the defendant has committed another
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HERMAN, supra note 16, at 183. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].
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NASHERI, supra note 12, at 22 (citing Santobello v. U.S., 404 U.S. 257 (1971)). [reproduced
in Appendix, Tab L]. In Santobello, the prosecutor agreed to make no recommendation to the
judge concerning the sentence to be imposed. Later in the case, another prosecutor was
assigned the case and decided that the agreement was not binding on him, and proceeded to
recommend a sentence of one year. The Supreme Court ruled that the subsequent prosecutor
was bound to the agreement entered into by the first prosecutor. Id.
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See id. (citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 505 (1984)). In Mabry, the Supreme Court appears
to have reduced adherence to contract principles. The Court held that a defendant who had not
relied upon the prosecutor’s promise by waiving any constitutional rights and pleading guilty,
could not have the terms of the agreement enforced. Id.

124

HERMAN, supra note 2, at 184. [reproduced in Appendix, Tab M].

29

crime after the prosecutor has made the promise.125 In contrast, the prosecutor
may not breach his promise: (1) because he has had a change of heart; (2)
because another prosecutor in the office disagrees with the promise; (3) in the
absence of fraud, because of a unilateral mistake or a mutual mistake; or (4) in
light of the discovery of new evidence/ facts concerning the seriousness of the
defendant’s offense .126

4.

Fundamental Observations on Plea Bargaining in Canada

In contrast to the United States, “there are very few cases in which
Canadian Courts have expressed a view as to the merits or propriety of
prosecutorial plea bargaining or have hinted at plea bargaining in any way.”127 In
fact the most noteworthy and significant cases concerning plea bargaining did
not take place until after 1970.128 In addition, there are even fewer guidelines
governing plea bargaining.129 The approach applied by the Canadian criminal
justice system is “cautious.”130 The Canadian courts have not provided a “clear
stamp of approval” to plea bargaining.131 However, courts that have addressed
the issue, have been mainly concerned with “avoiding unfairness ‘not only to the
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Magistrate but to the accused.’”132 Canadian courts have also attempted to
achieve this end even when dealing with issues of breach and performance.133
As a preliminary matter, judges in the Canadian criminal justice system,
who are responsible for determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed on
a defendant,134 can under no circumstance intimate to a defendant the sentence
he will impose if the defendant agrees with the prosecutor to plead guilty nor if
the defendant decides to plead not guilty and is convicted.135 The reason courts
prohibit participation by the judge in the plea bargaining process is to provide the
defendant “complete freedom of choice to plead guilty or not guilty.”136 Thus, it is
clear that Canadian courts addressing plea bargaining are primarily concerned
with avoiding guilty pleas by defendants who are innocent yet consider pleading
guilty because of their uncertainty regarding the ultimate disposition.
Similar to the United States, issues of breach and performance of plea
agreements have also been resolved using traditional contract principles.
However, the purpose of these decisions has not been to rule on the propriety of
plea bargaining, but rather have focused upon the fairness to the defendant who
accepts the plea agreement and relies on it to his detriment. Thus, Canadian
courts have often simply ignored the entire issue of the propriety of the plea
agreements, but acknowledged its presence and proceeded to hold the
132
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136

Id.

31

prosecutor to his promise on the contract theory of detrimental reliance.137 An
identical issue was presented to the Quebec Court of Appeals in Attorney
General of Canada v. Roy (1972)138 and again the contract theory of detrimental
reliance was applied. The court stated:
[t]he Crown, like any other litigant, ought not to be heard to repudiate
before and appellate court the position taken by its counsel in the trial
court, except for the gravest possible reasons. Such reasons might be
where the sentence was an illegal one, or where the Crown can
demonstrate its counsel was somehow misled, or finally, where it can be
shown that the public interest in the orderly administration of justice is
outweighed by the gravity of the crime and the gross insufficiency of the
sentence.139
One final and extremely important case, though highly exceptional,140 is
Perkins & Pigeau v. The Queen (1976).141 In this case, the Quebec Court of
Appeals addressed a plea agreement that involved a promise by the prosecutor
to the defendant for an offense that was less serious and different from the
offense for which he had been originally charged. The court rejected such an
agreement, stating:
“[e]ither the accused was guilty and must face the mandatory
sentence impose by law or he was innocent and must be
acquitted. A plea to a lesser offense may be accepted if the
Crown doubts its ability to prove a charge, but that was not the
case here since the Crown attorney admitted having enough
evidence to establish importing.”142
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This case, however, is the exception rather than the rule.143

143

Id. at 58.
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